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IN THE SUPREME CbURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAN ENERGY, a/k/a ENERGY CATALYST ] 
COMPANY, i 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
CARL MARTIN, ] 
Defendant and Respondent. ] 
i Case No. 890400 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from Decision in Favor of Defendant, June 12, 1989 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County 
Honorable Ray M. Harding, District Judge 
JURISDICTION 
As a basis for its appeal, Pan Energy relies on Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2-2(3) (1986 Supp,)-
PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
Appellant, Pan Energy, appealed from the final order 
rendered by the Honorable Ray M. Harding, Judge of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court, in and for Utah County. On appeal, 
Pan Energy claims that the Utah Trial Court erred by dismissing 
1 
its action to enforce a judgment declared unenforceable by the 
rendering court and vacating the judgment.! 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Respondent, Martin, disagrees with Pan Energy's 
characterization of the issues presented for review and, 
therefore, submits the following: 
Issue I 
Did the Utah Trial Court correctly afford full faith and 
credit to the Oklahoma Court's order declaring the judgment 
unenforceable? 
Issue II 
Does Utah's borrowing statute, § 78-12-45, Utah Code 
Annotated, require dismissal of the action to enforce the 
judgment filed in Utah when that judgment is declared 
unenforceable in the rendering sister state? 
1
 A copy of the Memorandum of Decision and Order are 
marked Exhibits 1 and 2, respectively, and are contained in the 




Was it within the Utah Trial Court's discretion to afford 
comity to the Oklahoma decision that its judgment is 
unenforceable? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Pan Energy's brief does not cite controlling constitu-
tional provisions or statutes. Nonetheless, Martin relies on 
the following: 
A. Constitutional Provisions. 
Full Faith and Credit Clause -- Constitution of 
the United Statesf Article IV, Section 1. 
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State 
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial 
Proceedings of every other State; And the Congress 
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which 
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, 
and the Effect thereof. 
B. Utah Code Annotated, 
1. Utah Borrowing Statute —* Section 78-12-45 
Action barred in another state barred here. 
When a cause of action has arisen in another state 
or territory, or in a foreign country, and by the 
laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be 
maintained against a person by reason of the lapse 
of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained 
against him in this state, except in favor of one 
who has been a citizen of this state and who has 
held the cause of action from the time it accrued. 
3 
2. Applicable provision of the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act — Section 78-22a-8, 
Uniformity of interpretation. 
This chapter shall be construed to effectuate the 
general purpose to make uniform the law of those 
states which enact it. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Pan Energy initiated its action in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court for Utah County (the "Utah Trial Court"), on 
August 20, 1987, by filing a judgment rendered by the United 
States District Court, for the District of Oklahoma, Northern 
Division (the "Oklahoma Court" or the "rendering court") on 
September 21, 1982. (Record at I). 2 Though Pan Energy 
obtained its Oklahoma judgment on September 21, 1982, it took 
no action to save that judgment as required by Oklahoma law. 
(Record at 136) . 
After the Utah filing of the foreign judgment, Martin 
moved to stay the Utah proceedings to challenge the 
enforceability of the judgment in the Oklahoma Court. (Record 
at 11) . The Utah Trial Court granted Martin's motion and 
^ Pursuant to Rule 24(e) of the Rules of the Supreme 
Court, Martin has referenced pertinent pages of the original 
record. Though the facts of this case should not be disputed, 
Pan Energy has not made reference to the record and it is not 
clear how Pan Energy supports its abbreviated version of the 
facts. For purposes of this brief, Martin assumes Pan Energy 
agrees with Martin's citations to the record. 
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stayed the enforcement proceedings pending a determination of 
Martin's challenges by the Oklahoma Court. (Record at 17). 
Martin successfully challenge^ the validity of the 
judgment in the Oklahoma Court, which, on July 14, 1988, ruled 
that the judgment was dormant and unenforceable.3 (Record at 
133) . 
Martin then asked the Utah Trial Court to vacate the 
judgment and dismiss Pan Energy's 0tah action. (Record at 
121). On June 12, 1989, the Honorable Ray M. Harding granted 
Martin's motion, vacated the judgment and dismissed Pan 
Energy's action. (Record at 161-63). Pan Energy appeals from 
that decision. 
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. 
1. In 1982, Pan Energy, a Montana corporation, obtained 
a judgment against Mr. Martin, in the United States District 
Court for the District of Oklahoma. Almost five years after 
the judgment was rendered by the Oklahoma Court, Pan Energy 
filed its judgment in Utah. (Record at 1). 
J
 A copy of the Order entered by the Oklahoma Court is 
marked Exhibit 3 and is contained in the Addendum attached 
hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
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2. During the intervening period, Pan Energy's only 
effort to enforce the judgment consisted of having a writ of 
execution issued in the State of Idaho. Though this writ was 
issued, it was not executed or filed with any court. (Record 
at 133). 
3. Mr. Martin then sought to challenge the validity of 
Pan Energy's judgment in the Oklahoma Court and enforcement in 
Utah was stayed pending the Oklahoma Court's decision. (Record 
at 11-18). 
4. The rendering Oklahoma Court found that Pan Energy 
did not take steps sufficient to enforce its judgment as 
required by law. Even the Utah filing was not sufficient to 
save the judgment. (Record at 133) . Accordingly, the Oklahoma 
Court held that the judgment was not enforceable. (Record at 
136) . 
5. Pursuant to Martin's motion, the Utah Trial Court 
ruled that "where the judgment has been held to be 
unenforceable in the sister state, in effect, there is nothing 
in existence to which full faith and credit can be given. The 
Motion to Dismiss and to Vacate is therefore granted." (Record 
at 161). 
6 
6. Pan Energy now appeals from the ruling of the Utah 
Trial Court dismissing the action and vacating the judgment 
filed in Utah, (Record at 161-63). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue I 
Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution 
requires that full faith and credit be given to the laws and 
judicial proceedings of sister states. On July 14, 1988, the 
Oklahoma Court held that Pan Energy's judgment is 
unenforceable. Full faith and credit must be given to that 
decision. 
Pan Energy's claim that full faith and credit only can be 
given to the Oklahoma Court's original judgment, and not the 
laws defining the scope of that judgment or the subsequent 
judicial proceedings invalidating that judgment, is contrary to 
both the intent and express letter of the Full Faith and Credit 
clause. The Utah Trial Court ruled correctly when it applied 
full faith and credit to the Oklahoma Court's decision and 
thereby dismissed the action to enforce Pan Energy's 
unenforceable judgment. Indeed, it would be unjust to enforce 




While Pan Energy attempts to clothe its appeal in 
generalized theorems of conflict of laws analysis, Pan Energy 
has failed to address the implications of the Utah borrowing 
statute on the facts of this case. Conflict of laws analysis 
requires consideration of Utah's borrowing statute, Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-12-45, because the borrowing statute prevents 
Pan Energy from using Utah law to add life to a claim otherwise 
prohibited by the laws of the forum in which the claim arose. 
The borrowing statute must be read in conjunction with 
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. The intent of the Foreign 
judgment Act, inter alia, is "to effectuate the general purpose 
of making uniform the law of those states which enact it.,f 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-8. The Utah Trial Court's decision is 
a proper use of the Utah borrowing statute and effectuates the 
general intent of the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
Issue III 
The Utah Trial Court has the discretion to afford comity 
to the order of the Oklahoma Court. General principles of 
comity allow courts of one state to recognize the rulings of 
the courts of another state as a matter of courtesy. Such 
8 
courtesy is not mandatory under cofoity principles, but is 
advisable for the development and continuation of harmonious 
relationships between the states. The decision to afford 
comity is a matter of discretion, and such a decision only can 
be overruled when it can be shown that the court clearly abused 
its discretion. The Utah Trial Cou^t afforded comity to the 
decision of the Oklahoma Court. Absent a showing of abuse of 
this discretion, the Utah Trial Court's order must be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE OKLAHOMA DECISION IS ENTITLED TO 
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT. 
Martin agrees with Pan Energy that full faith and credit 
applies in this case. The real question, however, involves the 
manner of application of this principle, rather than the fact 
of its application. One must apply the law to the facts. 
Pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, Utah 
accords full faith and credit to the final determinations of 
sister states. Data Management. Iny. v. E.D.P. Corporation, 
709 P.2d 377 (Utah 1985). In this respect, the Oklahoma 
judgment, in conjunction with all its rights, obligations and 
restrictions, is entitled to full fai^h and credit in Utah. If 
the Oklahoma judgment was enforceable, Utah would be required 
to accord that judgment full faith and credit, absent a valid 
9 
constitutional challenge to the judgment. Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act, § 78-22a-l et seq., Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 
1987) . 
In the case at bar, however, the Oklahoma Court 
determined that, under the laws of Oklahoma, the Oklahoma 
judgment is not enforceable. That Court's final determination 
regarding its own judgment must be given full faith and credit 
in Utah. Any other decision would create the peculiar 
situation where a judgment declared invalid by the rendering 
court continues to be enforced despite that court's ruling. 
The Utah Foreign Judgments Act is designed to avoid such an odd 
result. 
Section 78-22a-8, Utah Code Annotated, states that 
"[t]his chapter shall be construed to effectuate the general 
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact 
it." To give a uniform effect to the Oklahoma laws, Utah must 
recognize the Oklahoma decision rendering the judgment 
unenforceable. If it does not, the Oklahoma statute of 
limitation regarding the enforcement of judgments is rendered 
meaningless and this Court denies full faith and credit to 
Oklahoma judgments and statutes. 
10 
The original Oklahoma judgment was granted in conjunction 
with all that state's laws effecting its validity and 
enforceability. Utah should give full faith and credit to the 
Oklahoma judgment; it should not add rights to the judgment 
that Oklahoma would not provide. The Utah Trial Court held: 
After consideration of the memoranda submitted in this matter, 
the Court finds that the Oklahoma judgment which is the basis 
for this action has been held to be unenforceable in Oklahoma. 
The Constitution of the United States requires that Utah give 
full faith and credit to the judgments of sister states. Where 
the judgment has been held to be unenforceable in the sister 
state, in effect, there is nothing in existence to which full 
faith and credit can be given. The motion to dismiss and to 
vacate is therefore granted. 
Memorandum Decision of May 17, 1989, Fourth Judicial District 
Court for Utah County, Judge Ray M. Harding. (Record at 161). 
The Utah Trial Court's ruling insures a consistent and 
uniform interpretation of laws of both Utah and Oklahoma. The 
Oklahoma determination is not circumvented and the purpose of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-22a-8 is achieved. "Thus, full faith 
and credit is insured, rather than denied, the law of the 
judgment State." Watkins v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188, 191 (1966). 
A. Pan Energy Ignores The Fact Th^t The Utah Filing Did Not 
Save Its Judgmeilt* 
In the present case, the Oklahoma Court ruled that the 
judgment was not enforceable, even though the Court knew that 
the judgment had been filed in Utah. Apparently, Pan Energy 
presumes that once the Oklahoma judgment is filed in Utah, the 
11 
penumbra of rights, obligations and restrictions within that 
judgment lose all significance. 
A valid foreign judgment does become a Utah judgment upon 
filing because Utah accords that judgment full faith and credit 
under the Foreign Judgment Act. Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-l, et 
seq. The underlying premise for recognizing this judgment in 
Utah, however, is that full faith and credit is accorded the 
final determinations of a sister state, nothing less and 
nothing more. Utah will recognize valid foreign judgments and 
enforce them in this state only to the extent that the 
rendering state would do so. 
Pan Energy's theory in this action cannot be correct 
because Pan Energy ignores the fact that the Utah filing did 
not save the Oklahoma judgment. The final determination of the 
Oklahoma Court is that plaintiff's judgment is unenforceable 
and cannot be revived. Consequently, the Utah Trial Court's 
dismissal of the action was proper. 
B. Instead Of Dealing With The Relevant Facts, Pan Energy 
Hides Behind Irrelevant And Misconstrued Case Law 
Rather than deal with the relevant facts of the case, 
Pan Energy argues points of law which are irrelevant and in 
some instances incorrect. Pan Energy's procedural argument 
12 
regarding the Utah statute of limitations disregards the basic 
facts of the case. 
Pan Energy argues for enforcement of its invalid Oklahoma 
judgment by clothing that judgment as a Utah judgment and 
invoking an Erie-like doctrine regarding procedural enforcement 
of a valid judgment. Pan Energy might be correct if there was 
a valid foreign judgment to which Utah should give full faith 
and credit. As the Utah Trial Court held, however, no such 
judgment exists. (Record at 161). 
Pan Energy dogmatically recites Utah case law which 
indicates that a foreign judgment cannot be collaterally 
attacked on the merits. (Brief of Appellant at 6-9). Pan 
Energy misconstrues Martin's positiorj.4 Martin attacked the 
Oklahoma judgment in the rendering qourt on the grounds that 
the judgment was unenforceable. No collateral, or direct, 
attack on the merits was made.5 
4
 Perhaps Pan Energy confuses Martin's position on the 
enforceability of the judgment with the fact that Martin did 
pay Pan Energy the full amount of the obligation upon which 
Pan Energy obtained its Oklahoma judgment. (Record at 46, 48-
49, 64). Clearly, Martin's payment of the underlying 
obligation cannot serve as a defense at this point in the Utah 
proceedings. 
5
 Indeed, Martin's attack on the merits has never been 
decided by any court. 
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Pan Energy also misconstrues the holdings of cases 
decided by the United States Supreme Court. For example, Pan 
Energy cites M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. 312 (1839), as the 
United States Supreme Court's "clear expression" of the 
"policies for the enforcement of foreign judgments in a sister 
state." (Appellate brief at 13-14). Far from being the 
Supreme Court's clear expression on the matter, the reasoning 
of M'Elmoyle has been questioned by the High Court. Watkins v. 
Conway, 385 U.S. at 189, n.l. As the Court in Watkins points 
out, the issue in M'Elmoyle "concerned the power of the states 
to impose any statute of limitation upon foreign judgments." 
Id. The very language cited by Pan Energy "must be read 
against this argument." Id. M'Elmoyle simply stands for the 
proposition that states may impose their own statutes of 
limitation on the judgments of sister states, nothing more. 
Again, in citing Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 
514 (1953), for the proposition "that the forum state's 
procedures for enforcement should be used rather than the 
foreign state's", Pan Energy ignores the intent of the High 
Court. Wells specifically states that 
We are not concerned with the reasons which have 
led some states for their own purposes to adopt the 
foreign limitation, instead of their own, in such 
situations. The question here is whether the Full 
Faith and Credit clause compels them to do so. Our 
prevailing rule is that the Full Faith and Credit 
clause does not compel the forum state to use the 
period of limitation of the foreign state. 
14 
The Court's point is that the Full Faith and Credit clause does 
not compel one state to adopt the statute of limitation of 
another, but, a state may do so. 
Indeed, that is exactly what happened in Watkins. There 
the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia Court's use of a Florida 
statute of limitation in the Georgia Court's enforcement of a 
Florida judgment. The Supreme Courx: case law cited by Pan 
Energy stands for the proposition that states which impose 
their own statutes of limitation on foreign judgments do not 
violate the Full Faith and Credit clause. These cases do not 
find that one state must impose its own statute of limitation. 
They indicate that one state may use statutes of limitation 
from other states. Utah's borrowing statute does just that. 
(See Argument II. Dismissal of Plaintiff's Action was Required 
Under Utah's Borrowing Statute, pages 16-19). 
Pan Energy cites the case of Rhoades v, Wright, 622 P.2d 
343 (Utah 1980), in support of its procedural claims. Even a 
cursory reading of Rhoades indicates that the case was 
determined on the egregiousness of its facts. There, a Utah 
widow whose husband had been gunned down by the couple's 
Colorado landlord, was caught in a procedural bind between 
decisions of Colorado and Utah courts. Both the Utah federal 
court and the Colorado state court procedurally barred this 
plaintiff's claims prior to a hearing on the merits. 
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Recognizing the severity of the facts, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
The implicit interest of Utah is, of course, in 
assuring that heirs, either individually or 
through a personal representative, have the 
opportunity to recover compensation for the 
wrongful death of a Utah resident.... Utah's 
interest is even stronger in this case because 
Utah must be viewed as the last forum available to 
the plaintiff. 
Id. at 347. 
The Utah Supreme Court, recognizing the fact that this 
was the Utah widow's last opportunity to be heard, used Utah 
procedural law to give that plaintiff a forum. If anything, 
Rhoades supports the proposition that conflict of laws analysis 
requires consideration of a state's interests, and to that end, 
Utah law should be construed to protect Utah residents from 
those who would manipulate procedural laws to their unfair 
advantage. Pan Energy is not a Utah corporation. 
Pan Energy cites the Restatement of Conflicts as 
demonstrating that "the prevailing thinking in this area of law 
is that the forum state applies its own procedures to enforce a 
judgment that is correctly filed in the forum state." (Pan 
Energy's Brief at 12) . Pan Energy, however, fails to identify 
that Utah, the forum state, determines whether to enforce a 
judgment by looking to its borrowing statute. See § 78-12-45, 
Utah Code Ann. (1987 Repl. Vol.). Further, while it may be the 
"traditional approach" of American Courts to distinguish 
16 
between substance and procedure, the trend is to weigh the 
interest of the forum against that of the rendering state. 
The view that statutes of limitations should 
ordinarily be characterized as procedural has been 
abandoned in many recent decisions. Under these 
decisions, the question whether a statute bars the 
right and not merely the remedy has lost its 
significance. The forum will no longer entertain a 
claim with which it has otherwise no contact simply 
because the statute is not barred by its own 
statute of limitations. Entertainment of the claim 
under such circumstances would disserve the forum's 
general policy against the prosecution of stale 
claims and would not serve any other forum 
interest. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §142 comment b (1971, 
1988 Revisions). See also, Rhoades. 622 P.2d at 347. 
Pan Energy's "procedural" argument regarding enforcement 
of a valid foreign judgment is not applicable to this case. 
There is no valid foreign judgment to enforce. Pan Energy 
overlooks the fact that the judgment it seeks to enforce is 
invalid in every other state of the union. Pan Energy did 
obtain an Oklahoma judgment. Five years later, Pan Energy 
filed that judgment in Utah. The Utah Trial Court, however, 
stayed the proceeding to allow the Oklahoma Court to determine 
i 
the enforceability of the judgment. The Oklahoma Court 
declared the judgment to be unenforceable. The Utah Trial 
Court recognized the unenforceability of Pan Energy's judgment 
and thereby gave the final determination of the Oklahoma court 
full faith and credit. 
17 
Accordingly, the Utah Trial Court properly dismissed Pan 
Energy's action and vacated Pan Energy's unenforceable 
j udgment. 
II. DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S ACTION WAS REQUIRED 
UNDER UTAH'S BORROWING STATUTE 
Pan Energy's Brief is misleading in that no where in the 
brief does it distinguish or even disclose the relevant statute 
in this case. Presumably, this is because the statute destroys 
Pan Energy's claim. The governing statute in this case is 
Utah's borrowing statute. 
When a cause of action has arisen in another state 
or territory, or in a foreign country, and by the 
laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be 
maintained against a person by reason of the lapse 
of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained 
against him in this state except in favor of one 
who has been a citizen of this state and who has 
held the cause of action from the time it accrued. 
Utah Code Ann.. § 78-12-45 (1987 Repl. Vol.) (emphasis added). 
Borrowing statutes were enacted to correct ''some of the 
anomalies that resulted from treating statutes of limitations 
as procedural, including aggravated examples of forum 
6
 The term "action1' as it is used in this section includes 
the type of post-judgment proceeding Pan Energy initiated in 
this case. Utah Code Ann.. § 78-12-46 (1987 Repl. Vol.) ("the 
word 'action' as used in this chapter, is to be construed, 
whenever it is necessary to do so, as including a special 
proceeding of a civil nature"). 
18 
shopping." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 
comment b (1971, 1988 Revisions). 
Pan Energy cannot pursue it^ unenforceable Oklahoma 
judgment in Utah. The Utah statute specifically precludes Pan 
Energy from bringing its claim against defendant in Utah 
because that claim arose in Oklahoma and the time in which to 
bring that claim has expired under Oklahoma law. Under Utah 
law, Pan Energy cannot use a longer Utah statute of limitations 
to add life to a claim that would otherwise be governed by a 
shorter foreign limitations statute. 
The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted Utah's borrowing 
statute in Lindsay v. Woodward, 299 P. 2d 619 (Utah 1956). In 
Lindsay, the defendant was injured in an automobile accident in 
June of 1952. Plaintiff, an Idaho physician who attended the 
defendant, was not paid, and brought suit in a Salt Lake City 
Court. Plaintiff obtained a default judgment when the 
defendant failed to answer. The defendant appealed to the 
District Court. For the first time, he asserted a counterclaim 
based on malpractice and alleged fraud and breach of contract. 
The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was granted and the 
defendant further appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
judgment because the defendant's counterclaim was time-barred 
by the Idaho statute of limitations, and, therefore, 
necessarily was barred by Utah's borrowing statute. 
19 
In the case at bar, the Utah Trial Court correctly 
granted Martin's motion to dismiss. The Oklahoma Court held 
that its judgment was unenforceable because the Oklahoma 
statute of limitations had expired. Accordingly, Utah's 
borrowing statute required the Utah Trial Court to dismiss the 
action. 
The Oklahoma statute of limitations is codified at 12, 
Oklahoma Statutes. § 735: 
If execution is not issued and filed as provided in 
Section 759 of this title, within five (5) years 
after the date of any judgment that now is or may 
hereafter be rendered, in any court of record in 
this state, or if five (5) years has intervened 
between the date that the last execution on such 
judgment was filed as provided by Section 759 of 
this title and the date that writ of execution was 
filed as also provided in Section 759 of this 
title, such judgment shall become unenforceable and 
of no effect, and shall cease to operate as a lien 
on the real estate of the judgment debtor.... 
(Record at 134). Since there was no execution on the Oklahoma 
judgment within five (5) years from the date of its rendering, 
the judgment was unenforceable. Merely filing the judgment in 
Utah before the limitations period expired could not save the 
judgment under Oklahoma law. 
The Utah borrowing statute requires our courts to look to 
Oklahoma statutes to determine the enforceability of an 
Oklahoma judgment. Thus, dismissal of the Utah action to 
enforce the Oklahoma judgment was required. 
III. IT WAS WITHIN THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION TO 
AFFORD COMITY TO THE OKLAHOMA DECISION. 
Even if the Utah Trial Court's actions were not required 
under full faith and credit, it w^ is a proper use of that 
court's discretion to afford comity to the Oklahoma Court's 
decision.7 Judicial comity is a principle in which a court of 
one state or jurisdiction gives effect to the laws and judicial 
decisions of another, not as a matter of obligation, but out of 
deference and respect. See 16 Am. Ju£. 2d, Conflict of Laws, § 
10 (1979). *[T]he tendency of modern decisions is toward a 
broader comity in the enforcement pf rights created by the 
legislatures of sister states. A state court, in conformity to 
state policy, may, by comity, give a remedy which the Full 
Faith and Credit clause does not compel." Id. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that the decision to 
apply comity rests within the sounc^  discretion of the trial 
court. Jackett v. L.A. Deot. of Water & Power. 771 P. 2d 1074 
1
 "In the review of judicial proceedings the rule is 
settled that if the decision below is correct, it must be 
affirmed, [even if] the lower court relied upon a wrong ground 
or gave a wrong reason". Keniston v. Roberts, 717 F.2d 1295, 
1300 n«3 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Helperina v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 
238, 245 (1937)). Also, Jett v. Sunderman, 840 F.2d 1487, 1493 
(9th Cir. 1988); Bruce vT United States, 759 F.2d 755 (9th 
Cir. 1985); Morris~v. Adams-Millis cforp. . 758 F.2d 1352 (10th 
Cir. 1985); Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 602 (9th Cir. 
1984) . 
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(Utah App. 1989). In Jackett, the plaintiff, Jackett, was 
injured in a helicopter emergency landing in Utah. The 
helicopter was owned and operated by the defendant, L.A. Water, 
a California governmental entity. Jackett brought suit for 
injury against L.A. Water and gave timely notice under 
California's Governmental Claims Act. He failed to file his 
complaint against L.A. Water, however, within the two-year 
statute of limitations required by the Act. Jackett's claim 
was time-barred in California and subsequently he filed suit 
in Utah. 
L.A. Water moved to dismiss Jackett's suit arguing that 
as a matter of comity, Utah should apply the California two-
year statute of limitations. Jackett argued that the Utah 
Court should apply the Utah four-year tort statute of 
limitations because normal conflict of laws analysis asserts 
that the forum's statute of limitations governs.8 The trial 
court agreed with L.A. Water and dismissed Jackett's complaint. 
Jackett, 771 P.2d at 1075. 
The issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in 
applying, as a matter of comity, California's two-year statute 
of limitations. The Utah Court of Appeals held that ''although 
8
 Apparently, Utah's borrowing statute, § 78-12-45 of the 
Utah Code, was not applicable because it governs cases where 
the claim arose in a foreign jurisdiction. Because the injury 
occurred in Utah, the claim would be deemed to have arisen in 
Utah, rather than the foreign state of California. 
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we agree with Jackett's analysis, the trial court may, 
nevertheless, apply the discretionarjy doctrine of comity to 
avoid the result otherwise compelled by a general conflict of 
laws analysis." Jackett, 771 P.2d at 1076.9 
In the present case, it cleartly was within the trial 
court's discretion to apply thd Oklahoma statute of 
limitations. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm the ruling of Judge Harding 
which vacated Pan Energy's judgment ^nd dismissed Pan Energy's 
action. The trial court properly gavi full faith and credit to 
the decision of the Oklahoma Court. The rendering court has 
ruled that the judgment is unenforceable. That order must be 
accorded full faith and credit. 
Applying full faith and credit to the Oklahoma Court's 
ruling does not create an unconstitutional dual standard for 
the enforcement of local and fordign judgments. Indeed, 
through the use of Utah's borrowing statute, the Utah Trial 
Court properly adhered to the intent of the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act. A decision to enforce the otherwise 
9
 "[CJourts have consistently fbund that the decision to 
apply comity rests within the sound discretion of the trial 
court." Jackett. 771 P.2d at 1075 (citations omitted). 
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unenforceable Oklahoma judgment would create inconsistent 
rulings under inconsistent applications of law. The Utah Trial 
Court avoided such inconsistency. Its order should be upheld. 
If for no other reason, the Utah Trial Court,s ruling 
should be affirmed as a proper use of discretion to apply 
comity to the decision of a sister state court. General 
principles of comity grant the Utah Trial Court the discretion 
to recognize the rulings of a sister state court as a matter of 
courtesy. The Utah Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in 
applying principles of comity. Its ruling should be affirmed. 
x-v UN-
DATED this c/g^  day of November, 1989. 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
Brenda L. Flanders 
Alexander H. Walker III 
Kristin G. Brewer 
(Mart in/Brief 3) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 22^ id day of November, 1989, 
I served four copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by 
depositing the same in the United Stages mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed as follows: 
ZABRISKIE, PATTON & PETRO 
Michael J. Petro 
3507 North University Ave. 
Jamestown Square, Suite 370 
Provo, Utah 84604 
-0&24^-4U^ 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAN ENERGY, a/k/a ENERGY CATALYST 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
CARL MARTIN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 890400 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from Decision in Favor of Defendant, June 12, 1989 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County 
Honorable Ray M. Harding, District Judge 
APPENDIX 
V 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICfr COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR tiJTAH COUNTY 
********************* ' & 
PAN ENERGY, f/k/a 
ENERGY CATALYST COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs~ 
CARL W. MARTIN, 
Defendant, 
CASEj NUMBER CV 87-1916 
RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
MEM0RANDUM DECISION 
* * * * * * • * * • • * * * * • * • * * * 
The Court, having considered defendant's motion to 
dismiss and motion to vacate, will grant tn^u motion. 
After consideration of the memoranda submitted in this 
matter, the Court finds that the Oklahoma judgment which is the 
basis for this action has been held to be unenforceable in 
Oklahoma. The Constitution of the United States requires that 
Utah give full faith and credit to the judgments of sister 
states. Where the judgment has been held £o be unenforceable in 
the sister state, in effect, there is nothing in existence to 
which full faith and credit can be given. The motion to dismiss 
and to vacate is therefore granted. 
Counsel for defendant to prepare [an order incorporating 
the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for 
approval as to form prior to filing with toe Court for signature. 
Dated this 17th day of May, 1989, 
BY ITHE COURT 
cc: Mark 0. Van Wagoner, Esq, 
Michael J. Petro, Esq. 
2 ^ - e ^ u ^ . ^ 
;M. HARDING, JU^IZ 
EXHIBIT 1 
1908 JAN -4 All & 43 
FRANK R. PIGNANELLI 4392 vv.'LLiAM F. HU !S^. Cl L'SK 
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL & LIAPIS --^ Q-fc.-j;:?£ plj^ . 
Attorneys for Defendant *""" ' u-
48 Post Office Place 
Third Floor, New York Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-6996 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
— > —ooOoo — 
ORDER 
Civil No. CV-87-1916 
PAN ENERGY f/k/a 
ENERGY CATALYST CO., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CARL W. MARTIN, 
Defendant. 
,—ooOoo 
The parties, by and through their respective counsel of 
Jeril B. Wilson for the Plaintiff, and Frank R. Pignanelli for 
the Defendant, having entered into a Stipulation in the above 
entitled matter, and said Stipulation being filed with the Court, 
and for such good cause shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED J 
1. That the bond required for Defendant's Motion to Stay 
Execution proceedings in the.above entitled matter is in the 
amount of $57,000.00. 
2c That said requirement of $57,000.00 bond for Defendant's 
Motion to Stay Execution proceedings is hereby satisfied by a 
letter of credit from a Utah banking institution, filed by 
EXHIBIT 2. 
Defendant, and draws against said letter of credit by plaintiff, 
will be effective upon dismissal by this Cdurt as against 
Defendant's Motion to Stay Execution by an^ Court of appropriate 
jurisdiction over Defendant's Motion to St^y Execution. 
3. That Defendant will execute, on ar annual basis, 
additional letters of credit in an amount 0qual to the amount 
stated above in addition to the interest adcrued for a year based 
upon statutory interest as required by the laws of the State of 
Oklahoma as necessary during the pendency cif these proceedings. 
2 
F I L E D 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA JUL 14 1988-
PAN ENERGY, f/k/a )
 Jack C Silver, Clerk 
ENERGY CATALYST CO., )
 a s # DISTRICT COURT 
Plaintiff, ) 
V, ) No. 82-C-496-B 
CARL W. MARTIN, ) 
Defendant. ) 
O R D E R 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Carl W. 
Martin's Motion to Extinguish Judgment.1 
On September 21, 1982, this Court awarded Plaintiff judgment 
against Defendant in the amount of $27,500.00. Subsequently, the 
Plaintiff has filed the judgment in both Utah and in Idaho. After 
filing the judgment in Idaho a writ of execution was issued in 
Idaho, but never filed. However, nothing in the Plaintiff's 
response brief indicates an attempt to enforce this judgment in 
Oklahoma. 
Process to enforce a money judgment rendered by a federal 
district court is usually a writ of execution under Fed.R.Civ.P. 
69, with the procedure on execution conforming to the practice and 
procedure of the state in which the District Court sits, except to 
the extent that an applicable federal statute provides otherwise.2 
The Court does not find authority to extinguish judgment. The 
Oklahoma Statutes refer to a judgment becoming dormant. 
2For a list of federal statutes which govern executions, see 
Notes of Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 69. 
CYU1RIT 2, 
7 Pt. 2 Moore's Federal Practice 569.04[3], citing Fink v. O'Neill, 
106 U.S. 272, 1 S.Ct. 325, 27 L.Ed. 196 (1882). The court 
determines that no federal statute is applicable. Therefore, state 
law governs on this issue before the court. 
The effective duration of a judgment is ijimited by the state's 
dormancy statute. Oklahoma's dormancy statute is codified at 12 
O.S. 1981 §735: 
"If execution is not - issued and filed as 
provided in Section 759 of this title, within 
five (5) years after the date of any judgment 
that now is or may hereafter be rendered, in 
any court of record in this state, or if five 
(5) years has intervened between thle date that 
the last execution on such judgment was filed 
as provided by Section 759 of thii title and 
the date that writ of execution was filed as 
also provided in Section 759 of iphis title, 
such judgment shall become unenforceable and 
of no effect, and shall cease to operate as a 
lien on the real estate of thfe judgment 
debtor...." 
and §739: 
"A. When a general execution is issued and 
placed in the custody of a sheriff for levy, 
a certified copy of such execution shall be 
filed in the office of the county clerk of the 
county whose sheriff holds such execution and 
shall be indexed the same as judgments. 
"B, If a general or special elxecution is 
levied upon lands and tenements, the sheriff 
shall endorse on the face of the writ the legal 
description and shall have three disinterested 
persons who have taken an oath to impartially 
appraise the property so levied on, upon actual 
view; and such disinterested persons shall 
return to the officer their signed (estimate of 
the real value of said property. 
11C. To extend a judgment lied 
initial or any subsequent statutory 
prior to the expiration of such 
certified copy of a general execution 
shall be filed and indexed in the 







in the county in which the judgment was 
rendered and in the office of the county clerk 
in each county in which the judgment was filed 
and the lien thereof is sought to be retained," 
Any Oklahoma judgment may become unenforceable if not executed upon 
within five years from rendition of the judgment. First of Denver 
Mortgage Investors v. Riqqs, 692 P.2d 1358, 1361 (Okla. 1984). A 
judgment creditor who files but does not execute the judgment in 
Oklahoma cannot revive the judgment after it has become, dormant by 
making a second filing. Id. at 1362. A judgment becomes dormant 
when the judgment creditor fails to obtain a writ of execution on 
a judgment within five years of date of original judgment, even 
though the judgment debtor had made several attempts to satisfy the 
judgment by garnishment. Chandler-Frates & Reitz v. Kostich, 63 0 
P.2d 1287 (Okla. 1981). Oklahoma strictly applies her dormancy 
statutes to foreign judgments. First of Denver Mortgage Investors 
v. Riggs, 692 P.2d 1358 (Okla. 1984). Oklahomafs dormant judgment 
statutes are to be strictly construed and the courts generally 
refuse to engraft exceptions to them other than those contained in 
the statutes themselves. Thomas v. Murray, 49 P.2d 1080 (Okla. 
1935). 
If the judgment is not executed on within the five-year period 
prescribed by statute, it becomes dormant and is not subject to 
being revived. Oklahoma's revivor statutes, 12 O.S. 1961, §§ 1071, 
1072 and 1077 were repealed in 1965 by Laws, 1965, Ch. 299, p. 535, 
and an attempted revivor after that date is a nullity, except to 
the extent of 12 O.S. 1971, §1081(b). Palmer v. Belford. 527 P.2d 
589, 590 (Okla. 1974). 
3 
The evidence before the Court reveals a yrit of execution was 
issued in Minidoka County, Idaho on May 5, 1983, but was never 
filed in Idaho nor in Oklahoma* Plaintiff shows the execution was 
placed in the sheriff's hands but was returned with no property 
found. The writ was never filed. 
The Tenth Circuit affirms the application of Oklahoma's 
dormant judgment statutes. Inaerton v. First [National Bank & Trust 
Co. , 291 F.2d 662 (10th Cir. 1961). The statute is clear on its 
face that a writ of execution must be issued ajnd filed in the State 
of Oklahoma within five years from the da^e of judgment. The 
Plaintiff has not complied with the requirements of 12 O.S. 1981 
§§ 735 and 759. Therefore, the judgment entered against Defendant 
on September 21, 1982 is unenforceable.3 Defendant's Motion to 
Declare Judgment Dormant is sustained. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this /'?"— day of Jtftly, 1988. 
/ 
THOMAS R. BRETT 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
3The Court does not rule on the enforceability of the judgment 
in Utah or Idaho. That issue is determined by Utah's and Idaho's 
law regarding foreign judgments and their enforceability. 
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78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction [Effective until Janu-
ary 1, 1988]. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating in: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; and 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
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(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except for the following matters: 
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (h). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but ihe 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
78-12-45. Action barred in another state barred here. 
When a cause of action has arisen in another state or territory, or in a 
foreign country, and by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot there be 
maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon 
shall not be maintained against him in this state, except in favor of one who 
has been a citizen of this state and who has held the cause of action from the 
time it accrued. 




Section. 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given 
in each State to the public Acts, Records, and 
judicial Proceedings of every other State; And the 
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Man-
ner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings 
shall be Droved, and the Effect thereof. 
78-22a-8. Uniformity of interpretation. 
This chapter shall be construed to effectuate the general purpose to make 
uniform the law of those states which enact it. 
History: C. 1953, 78-22a-8, enacted bv L. 
1983, ch„ 169, § 1. 
12, Oklahoma Statutes, § 735: 
If execution is not issued and filed as provided in 
Section 759 of this title, within fiye (5) years after 
the date of any judgment that now id or may hereafter 
be rendered, in any court of record in this state, or 
if five (5) years has intervened between the date that 
the last execution on such judgment was filed as 
provided by Section 759 of this title and the date that 
writ of execution was filed as also provided in Section 
759 of this title, such judgment shall become 
unenforceable and of no effect, anji shall cease to 
operate as a lien on the real estate of the iudqment 
debtor.••• 
